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ABSTRACT 
This study explores why academic entrepreneurs seek patents for spin-off technology in weak 
organizational regimes (the employee owns her inventions) and strong organizational regimes 
(the employer, i.e. the university or research organization, owns these inventions). 
Specifically, we examine organizational and founding team characteristics as alternative 
explanations. Matched data of academic spin-offs from both contexts combined with patent 
data shows that founding team characteristics (expert knowledge and entrepreneurial 
orientation) matter in weak, but not strong regimes. In contrast, organizational patenting 
norms are the key driver of patenting in strong, but not weak regimes. We discuss the 
implications of our results for the current literature and technology transfer policies. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Legal reforms in many countries, such as the Bayh-Dole act in the US (Shane, 2004a) or 
the Employees’ Inventions Act in Germany (Harhoff and Hoisl, 2007), have given property 
rights in federally funded research to the employer. Often this initiated a shift from a ‘weak 
organizational regime’ (i.e., the employee holds the property rights in her inventions made at 
work) to a ‘strong organizational regime’ (i.e., the employer—the university or research 
organization—holds property rights in employee inventions). This change seems to have 
radically altered the way academic entrepreneurs (i.e., scientists who commercially exploit 
their discoveries by creating their own ventures) can protect their firms’ knowledge base. But 
how drastic is the change really? Some scholars now view the employer as the sole decision-
maker in patenting (Shane, 2004). Other scholars highlight the great informal influence 
scientists can still exert on their employers’ decision to patent their inventions or not 
(Agrawal, 2006; Jensen and Thursby, 2001). However, to date, the literature has been 
resoundingly silent on the question why academic entrepreneurs seek patents and what 
difference the organizational regime makes in this context. This oversight is surprising given 
the ongoing debate about the efficacy of patents (e.g., Arundel, 2001; Lanjouw and 
Schankerman, 2004; Lowe, 1993; Shane, 2001)—in particular for start-ups and small firms 
(Leiponen and Byma, 2009; Thomä and Bizer, 2013)—and the threat that patenting could 
become an organizational automatism also in situations where other protection strategies are 
advisable.  
In exploring patenting rationales, our study builds on different streams of existing 
research. One stream has suggested that scientists who conduct more applied research 
(Sellenthin, 2009), have published intensively (Azoulay et al., 2007; Dietz and Bozeman, 
2005; Van Looy et al., 2006), gained more industry experience (D’Este and Perkmann, 2011; 
Meyer, 2006), or received industry funding (Carayol, 2007; Landry et al., 2007), are more 
likely to disclose and let the organization patent their inventions. A second stream has 
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suggested that firms, which are intensively conducting R&D (Brouwer and Kleinknecht, 
1999), export-oriented (Arundel and Kabla, 1998), and active in certain industries (Mansfield, 
1986), are more likely to patent. A third stream has examined impacts of Bayh-Dole-like acts, 
suggesting, for instance, that the Bayh-Dole act had little effect on university patenting in 
general, but was influential only in certain fields and for certain universities (Henderson et al., 
1998; Mowery and Ziedonis, 2002; Sampat et al., 2003; Shane, 2004a). Universities outside 
the US, while showing increasing interest in claiming their intellectual property rights (Della 
Malva et al., 2013; Dornbusch and Neuhäusler, 2015), were found to initially lack the 
necessary support infrastructure to fully benefit from such legal reforms (Baldini, 2009). 
Research within this stream also suggests that US universities own a higher share of academic 
patents than their European counterparts, arguably as a result of the time lag in legal reforms 
(Lissoni et al., 2008; Lissoni, 2012). Another study shows that the size of technology transfer 
offices, of which many were created after the reforms (Sampat, 2006), promotes start-up 
activity, but not patenting activity (Van Looy et al., 2011).  
Despite substantial scholarship, a few significant gaps remain in our understanding of 
academic entrepreneurs’ patenting. First, previous findings for scientists and firms are not 
necessarily generalizable to academic entrepreneurs: Unlike firms, academic entrepreneurs 
have, at least formally, lost discretion over patenting in countries implementing Bayh-Dole-
like acts. Academic entrepreneurs can retain greater preference for publishing instead of 
patenting intellectual capital than entrepreneurs with business backgrounds (Link and Ruhm, 
2011). Unlike non-founding scientists, academic entrepreneurs take financial responsibility 
for commercializing their inventions, can suffer from losing control over the invention by 
patenting via the employer (Shane, 2002; Thursby and Thursby, 2002), and have to balance 
academic and entrepreneurial careers as well as university and spin-off interests in patenting 
(Nicolaou and Birley, 2003). Second, although impacts of Bayh-Dole-like acts have been 
widely investigated, no study (that we know of) has illuminated how patenting by academic 
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entrepreneurs differs in weak and strong organizational regimes. While the propensity to 
engage in patenting processes may hinge on a mix of individual and organizational influences 
(Azoulay et al., 2007; Bercovitz and Feldman, 2008) it is still unclear whether and how Bayh-
Dole-like acts affect the relative importance of these influences. 
To address the above gaps, this study examines the relative influence of founding team 
characteristics (expert knowledge and entrepreneurial orientation) vis-à-vis organizational 
characteristics (publication norms, patenting norms, and patenting capabilities) on academic 
entrepreneurs’ propensity to seek patents. More specifically, we compare the role of these 
characteristics in two contexts, namely weak and strong organizational regimes. We use 
Ajzen’s (1991) theory of planned behavior to illuminate the theoretical ‘black box’ 
surrounding our hypothesized relationships. A matched sample of spin-offs from public 
universities and public research organizations in Germany allowed us to study different 
organizational regimes. The university sample represents weak organizational regimes by 
containing spin-offs founded prior the reform of the Employees’ Inventions Act in 2002—a 
time when university professors, lecturers, and scientific assistants still had de jure ownership 
in their inventions (Harhoff and Hoisl, 2007). Public research organizations represent strong 
organizational regimes as they are governed under the Employees’ Inventions Act of 1957, 
granting the employer full ownership in employee inventions. 
This article contributes to the extant literature in several ways. First, our results indicate 
that in strong organizational regimes, only organizational patenting norms, but not expert 
knowledge or entrepreneurial orientation matter for patenting. This extends the literature on 
Bayh-Dole-like acts by showing how much the implementation of such acts can affect 
patenting rationales of academic entrepreneurs up to a point, where patenting might become 
an organizational automatism. Second, our focus on academic entrepreneurs adds to the wider 
literature on patenting that has been limited to either scientists (e.g., Baldini, 2009) or 
established firms (e.g., Arundel and Kabla, 1998). Our findings suggest that academic 
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entrepreneurs patent for reasons partly similar, partly different to those identified for scientists 
and firms. Third, scholars have theorized that the organizational influence on patenting may 
flow via two mechanisms, including organizational norms and organizational support 
(Baldini, 2009; Bercovitz and Feldman, 2008; Sellenthin, 2009). This study is one of the first 
to test both possibilities in concert. Significant findings for organizational patenting norms, 
but not organizational patenting capabilities seem to confirm the first explanation. Finally, our 
study contributes to the long-standing debate on the relationship between patenting and 
publishing (e.g., Geuna and Nesta, 2006; Larsen, 2011). According to our findings for 
academic entrepreneurs, there is no significant link between the two domains, suggesting that 
they co-exist rather than complement or substitute one another.  
 
THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT 
In deciding whether to patent or not, academic entrepreneurs have to weigh several 
benefits and risks of patenting. Patents can safeguard their spin-off’s knowledge-base against 
early imitation by defining property rights (Harter, 1994), attract venture capital (Wright et 
al., 2006; Mann and Sager, 2007), support inter-firm partnering (Hertzfeld et al., 2006), and, 
if effective, yield substantial competitive advantage (Kaiser, 2009; Song et al., 2008). Their 
signaling function can make patents a necessary cost for ensuring a start-up’s viability 
(Levitas and McFadyen, 2009). On the other hand, patents require the disclosure of critical 
information, thereby enabling competitors to imitate or ‘invent around’ a patent (Arundel, 
2001; Kultti et al., 2007). Patenting is considerably time-consuming and expensive and can be 
a suboptimal strategy for spin-offs lacking the resources to effectively litigate and enforce 
their rights in cases of infringement (Arundel, 2001; Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004). 
The patenting decision does not always rest with the academic entrepreneur alone 
because jurisdictions handle property rights to employee inventions differently. Some 
jurisdictions permit the inventor to retain full property rights and to independently file a 
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patent (Sellenthin, 2009). Yet, even in this ‘weak organizational regime’, some academic 
entrepreneurs may involve the organization in the patenting process, in order to benefit from 
organizational support in writing and, if necessary, defending a patent or to comply with 
general expectations (Bramwell and Wolfe, 2008; Sampat, 2006). Other jurisdictions entitle 
organizations to patent on behalf of their employees, if the invention results from federally 
funded research. These ‘strong organizational regimes’ result from legal regulations that have 
been in place for research organizations for a long time (Harhoff and Hoisl, 2007). In contrast, 
many universities shifted to a strong regime through legal reforms that started in the 1980s 
with the Bayh-Dole Act in the US (Mowery et al., 2001) and were later also implemented in 
other countries (e.g., Baldini, 2009). The inventor is required to disclose discoveries made 
during working time, let the organization decide whether to patent and, in case, obtain a 
license prior to firm founding. Otherwise, the inventor is free to patent in his or her own 
name. To some academic entrepreneurs, this may appear as a choice between letting the 
technology transfer office (TTO) file a patent, thereby risking to lose control over the 
invention (Shane, 2002; Thursby and Thursby, 2002), or creating a venture without filing a 
patent prior to founding and accepting the involved legal and ethical risks (Aldridge and 
Audretsch, 2010; Bercovitz and Feldman, 2008).1 Other academic entrepreneurs may 
welcome the organizational support. However, even in a strong organizational regime, 
inventors can informally influence the organization’s decision to patent and license back 
because they can make the invention appear more or less valuable in the disclosure, the 
commercialization success critically depends on the inventor’s cooperation (Agrawal, 2006; 
Jensen and Thursby, 2001), and many organizations do not patent before a licensee is found 
(Bercovitz and Feldman, 2008; Shane, 2002).2  
                                                 
1  Many academic inventors do not disclose their inventions (Bercovitz and Feldman, 2008; Landry et al., 2007; 
Jensen et al., 2003). Of these, some are interested in commercialization but consider the TTO difficult to work 
with or are unwilling to share revenues with the university (Thursby et al., 2009). 
2  Our interviews with inventors showed that some universities even stop to renew patents, once the inventor has 
changed the employer. 
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To further explore the black box between patenting rationales and patenting, we adopt 
the lens of the theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1991). In its basic tenet, behavior is driven 
by intentions and intentions, in turn, are determined by attitudes, i.e. the appraisal of the 
behavior, subjective norms, i.e. social pressures to perform or not a given behavior, and 
perceived behavioral control, i.e. the perceived ease or difficulty of performing a behavior. 
We use the theory only to understand the mechanisms behind our hypothesized relationships 
and do not test it empirically. However, meta-analyses have confirmed the theory’s strong 
explanatory power for various behaviors (e.g., Armitage and Conner, 2001). In keeping with 
prior research, our study models engagement in patenting processes as a function of 
individual and organizational influences (Azoulay et al., 2007; Bercovitz and Feldman, 
2008).3 Thus, in the following sections, we will theorize that the effect of founding team and 
organizational characteristics on the tendency to seek patents flows via the attitudes, 
subjective norms, and/or perceived behavioral control. Founding team characteristics include 
expert knowledge and entrepreneurial orientation, a choice consistent with prior findings for 
the importance of knowledge and motivation in an entrepreneurship context (e.g., McMullen 
and Shepherd, 2006). In line with the extant literature (e.g., Bercovitz and Feldman, 2008), 
organizational characteristics include patenting norms and publication norms. We add 
organizational patenting capabilities, a theoretically important aspect (Mowery et al., 2002) 
that has received increasing attention (APE-INV Project, 2009; Meyer, 2006; Van Looy et al., 
2006; Van Looy et al., 2011), but is still worth to be studied in the more specific context of 
academic entrepreneurship. 
 
                                                 
3  Some entrepreneurship scholars have argued that spin-offs are dependent on patentability considerations and 
tend to be created in fields with high patent effectiveness (e.g., Lowe, 1993; Shane, 2001). Many founders 
should therefore jointly take the decision to start a venture and patent. In contrast, our model views patent 
decisions as determined by various influences. Thus, we conceptually disentangle the decision to patent from 
the decision to create a venture.  
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Founding team characteristics 
Expert Knowledge 
Expert knowledge refers to the extent to which founders are experts in their 
technological fields and knowledge about their venture’s core technology is unavailable via 
external sources. Greater expert knowledge should drive academic entrepreneurs to patent 
more actively due to a more favorable attitude towards patenting. In established firms, 
different individuals possess critical technological know-how, manage and own the firm, 
causing agency problems. Such firms often patent to safeguard against knowledge losses 
when key R&D employees quit to join or start a rival (Kim and Marschke, 2005). In contrast, 
academic entrepreneurs jointly have critical expert knowledge about the core technology and 
ownership of their spin-offs. Such knowledge is often not wide-spread and should play a 
special role for patenting by these entrepreneurs (Agrawal, 2006). If knowledge is scarce, the 
human capital retained by the discovering scientists becomes the main resource around which 
firms are built (Zucker et al., 1998). To the extent to which expert knowledge is also tacit, it 
can serve as a source of competitive advantage (Hatch and Dyer, 2004). Patenting requires to 
partly codify such knowledge and entails, at least in part, a shift from a secrecy defense 
enabled through tacit expert knowledge to a patenting defense.  
Given their expertise, scientists with expert knowledge are more likely to arrive at novel 
and non-obvious discoveries, possibly applicable to patent protection (Calderini et al., 2007). 
Often such knowledge cannot be completely codified or scientists have few incentives to do 
so because returns to codification are below returns to time invested in further research 
(Zucker et al., 2002). Nevertheless, by filing at least some patents, entrepreneurs can reap key 
benefits from patenting, such as building reputation (Blind et al., 2006) or attracting venture 
capital (Wright et al., 2006). Even if these patents fail, sufficient expert knowledge remains to 
shield the venture’s knowledge base against imitation. For instance, Agrawal (2006) 
illustrated the pivotal role of inventor knowledge by demonstrating that licensees who directly 
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engaged the inventor realized greater commercialization success. Moreover, Arundel (2001) 
argues that patents and secrecy are not always mutually exclusive appropriation mechanisms, 
but can be used sequentially or simultaneously. Thus, expert knowledge can complement 
patents, thereby providing a more effective shield against imitation. Extensive knowledge 
stocks allow to employ a ‘hybrid protection strategy’ by patenting one (part of an) invention 
and keeping another one secret. If competitors require both parts to imitate a spin-off’s core 
technology, it is safe as long as one safeguard holds. Thus, expert knowledge allows academic 
entrepreneurs to benefit from patenting with fewer risks involved, thereby shaping more 
positive attitudes towards patenting. Thus, ceteris paribus, 
 




Entrepreneurial-oriented academics have, as we suggest below, more positive attitudes 
towards patenting and will therefore more actively seek patents. Entrepreneurial orientation is 
defined as the processes, structures, and behaviors that are characterized by innovativeness, 
proactiveness, and risk taking (Covin and Slevin, 1989; Miller and Friesen, 1983). 
Innovativeness reflects the tendency to actively support new ideas, novelty, experimentation, 
and creative solutions in pursuit of competitive advantage. Risk-taking involves a tendency to 
take business-related chances regarding strategic actions in uncertain environments. 
Proactiveness denotes a tendency to anticipate and act on future needs by introducing new 
products and services ahead of competition (Covin and Slevin, 1989; Lumpkin and Dess, 
1996). Although originally conceptualized for firms, we suggest that entrepreneurial 
orientation also reflects the degree to which academic entrepreneurs have adopted 
entrepreneurial roles besides academic roles. The founders’ mindset may, in turn, shape the 
  10 
entrepreneurial orientation of the emerging firm. This is consistent with research suggesting 
that values and norms of the founder or founding team become imprinted on the culture, 
routines, and collective identity of the emerging organization (Schein, 1983), which is 
believed to be relatively stable until founders start to depart (Bryant, 2014).  
Academics engaging in commercialization activities tend to differ in the extent of 
accepting values of the business world, in particular the focus on private property and profits, 
vis-à-vis traditional academic values, in particular the focus on open knowledge sharing and 
peer recognition (Hoang and Gimeno, 2010; Jain et al., 2009). Entrepreneurial-oriented 
founders are likely to appreciate the opportunities that patent protection creates for developing 
their ventures. These founders compete on the basis of their technological skills in the belief 
that successful innovation emanates from effective R&D (Atuahene-Gima and Ko, 2001). 
Since they strive for a technology leadership rather than a follower strategy (Lumpkin and 
Dess, 1996), patent protection creates favorable conditions for their experimentation with new 
technologies in search of creative product applications (Shane, 2001). A well-protected 
technological base allows pursuing a more aggressive growth strategy for technology ventures 
with a lower risk of knowledge misappropriation. Patents help ‘claim stakes’ on the market 
for technology and defend a leading position in a possible technology race that many spin-offs 
face at the outset. Overall, since patenting allows to engage in activities consistent with more 
entrepreneurial attitudes (Covin and Slevin, 1989), founders high in entrepreneurial 
orientation are more prone to seek patents. In contrast, founders with a stronger academic 
orientation are likely to perceive conflicts with traditional academic attitudes, leading them 
engage in only symbolic patenting or no patenting at all (Bercovitz and Feldman, 2008). 
Thus, ceteris paribus, 
 
Hypothesis 1b. The higher the entrepreneurial orientation, the higher the patent propensity of 
academic entrepreneurs. 
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Organizational Characteristics 
Organizational Patenting Norms 
Organizational patenting norms refer to social norms related to patenting. They should 
increase the patent propensity of academic entrepreneurs by shaping subjective norms. Elster 
(1989) defines social norms as unwritten codes of conduct within a group that stipulate 
acceptable behavior, are shared by others and partly sustained by their approval and 
disapproval.4 Individuals typically try to comply with norms to remain in good standing with 
a group and to, ultimately, maintain their membership (Kandori, 1992). Violations of norms 
often entail social sanctions, including internal sanctions such as guilt and remorse or external 
sanctions such as gossip and ostracism (Meek et al., 2010). In contrast to legal regulations, 
which are enforced by third-parties and out of self-interest, social norms are enforced by 
members of the group and not necessarily out of self-interest (Elster, 1989). This difference 
implies that legal reforms do not always induce changes in social norms. For instance, even 
after changes in jurisdiction, universities were found to vary in the degree to which they value 
commercialization activities besides traditional research activities (Bercovitz and Feldman, 
2008; Di Gregorio and Shane, 2003) and enforce their legal rights to commercialize employee 
inventions (Mowery and Ziedonis, 2002; Sellenthin, 2009).  
Organizational patenting norms reflect a strong culture of patenting that encourages 
further patenting activity.5 Such culture attracts faculty interested in patenting and socializes 
new organizational members into that norm (Owen-Smith and Powell, 2001). Moreover, 
academic entrepreneurs often retain their post in academia while pursuing entrepreneurial 
opportunities (Doutriaux, 1987). A long-term commitment to academia motivates them to 
                                                 
4  Social norms must also be distinguished from moral norms that denote the perceived moral correctness or 
incorrectness of certain behaviors (Elster, 1989; Rivis et al., 2009). 
5  It should be noted that an entrepreneurial culture does not necessarily involve a patenting culture. In the words 
of an MIT scientists interviewed by Agrawal and Henderson (2002:50): “There’s not a very strict patenting 
culture here, but we do support and encourage world-changing companies”. 
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comply with norms salient in their university or research organization. Thus, strong patenting 
norms may result in, at least, symbolic patenting by academic entrepreneurs, even when in 
dissonance to norms gained by prior experience (Bercovitz and Feldman, 2008). Several 
studies highlight the great role of norms. For instance, Louis et al. (1989) found that 
researchers located in universities where many other faculty members engaged in patenting 
were also more likely to patent. According to research by Calderini et al. (2007), scientists 
from institutions having filed at least one patent tend to patent more actively. Findings by 
Bercovitz and Feldman (2008) suggested that when colleagues are active in invention 
disclosure, other researchers in that unit follow the example. Taken together, organization-
level patenting norms influence individual-level subjective norms, which leads academic 
entrepreneurs to engage more actively in patenting. Thus, ceteris paribus, 
 
Hypothesis 2a. The stronger the organizational patenting norms, the higher the patent 
propensity of academic entrepreneurs. 
 
Organizational Patenting Capabilities 
Organizational patenting capabilities refer to the capability of an organization to 
successfully file patents. Academic entrepreneurs from organizations that have mastered 
patenting processes in the past should be more willing to seek patents. Entrepreneurs pursuing 
a patenting strategy are interested in filing high-quality patents that secure competitive 
advantage and prevent competitors from inventing around the patent (Arundel, 2001). 
Although some organizations, particularly top universities in the US (Shane, 2002), have 
developed superior patenting routines, this is not always the case for other organizations and 
countries. Findings for Italy, for instance, indicate that a lack of support by the university 
administration hinders patenting (Baldini, 2009). Similarly, Owen-Smith and Powell (2001) 
suggest that faculty participation in patenting is driven by perceptions and capabilities of the 
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university TTO. In Sellenthin’s (2009) study, scientists in those organizations offering greater 
support patented more actively. 
For academic entrepreneurs, involving the university or research organization can pose 
a considerable risk that the organization files low-quality patents. When an organizational 
patenting infrastructure is lacking or considered ineffective, academic entrepreneurs might 
decide to conceal a discovery from the administration, despite potential legal and ethical risks 
(Bercovitz and Feldman, 2008), or might exert influence to prevent patenting by the 
organization (Agrawal, 2006; Jensen and Thursby, 2001). However, studies suggest that 
universities can develop knowledge about patenting in a learning-by-doing process (Mowery 
et al., 2002; Owen-Smith and Powell, 2003). Sound organizational patenting routines can 
lower transaction costs involved in patenting and enhance the chances that a filed patent is 
eventually granted. According to Ajzen (1991), behavior is perceived as easier or more 
difficult, depending on past experience and anticipated impediments. Evidence of prior 
organizational success may increase the founders’ confidence in patenting via the 
organization, thereby promoting perceived behavioral control and ultimately the willingness 
to patent. Thus, ceteris paribus,  
 
Hypothesis 2b. The higher the organizational patenting capabilities, the higher the patent 
propensity of academic entrepreneurs. 
 
Organizational Publication Norms 
Organizational publication norms denote social norms related to publishing and should 
increase patent propensity. Given that the same research is often patentable and publishable 
(Agrawal and Henderson, 2002), scholars have intensively debated whether patenting and 
publishing are substitute or complementary activities (e.g., Azoulay et al., 2009; Crespi et al., 
2011; Czarnitzki et al., 2009; Geuna and Nesta, 2006; Larsen, 2011; Meyer, 2006). 
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Arguments for a substitution effect include that involvement in patenting, for instance, 
reduces the time available for publishing, encourages a shift away from more basic and 
publishable research to more commercially oriented research, and leads researchers to prefer 
secrecy to openly sharing and publishing their findings (Fabrizio and Di Minin, 2008). 
Moreover, published inventions are regarded as public knowledge and, thus, are not 
patentable anymore. Arguments for a complementary effect hold, for example, that patented 
research can still be submitted to a journal with a delay, patenting raises the awareness for 
new fruitful research areas, publishing increases the value of a patent by promoting the 
patented technology within the scientific community, and patenting provides additional 
funding for future projects (Fabrizio and Di Minin, 2008). 
We argue that academic entrepreneurs from organizations emphasizing publication 
excellence are more likely to seek patents. These organizations typically attract, recruit, and 
train high-quality researchers and provide a context in which reputation building through 
publications is valued. To reinforce existing norms, organizational rewards, such as financial 
incentives or promotions, are often linked to publications, incentivizing organizational 
members to publish more extensively. Since academic entrepreneurs face the same 
publication pressures as their non-founding peers, a continuous flow of high-quality 
publications is typically required to develop their academic careers. However, scholarly 
publications also serve as an important information source for the industry (Cohen et al., 
2002). Publications that are based on the same line of research as a spin-off can enable direct 
or potential competitors to access critical spin-off knowledge, posing considerable risks for its 
competitive position. Patenting first and publishing next is one possible way out of this 
dilemma and allows academic entrepreneurs to align academic and entrepreneurial career 
interests. Supporting this view, Carayol and Matt (2004) have shown that highly publishing 
labs also patent. Also Van Looy et al. (2006) found a complementary relationship between 
publication and patenting. If both activities are complementary, organizational publication 
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norms may, like patenting norms, shape subjective norms conducive to publishing and 
patenting by academic entrepreneurs. Thus, ceteris paribus,  
 
Hypothesis 2c. The stronger the organizational publication norms, the higher the patent 
propensity of academic entrepreneurs. 
 
Weak and Strong Organizational Regimes 
To recall, organizational regimes are defined by ownership of property rights to 
employee inventions: they are owned by the employee in weak regimes and by the employer 
in strong regimes. Thus, organizational regimes are shaped by the jurisdiction and depend on 
legal norms created and enforced by third parties (Elster, 1989). In strong regimes, employees 
are obliged to report an invention resulting from obligatory activity in the organization or 
based on experience or activities of the organization. The organization is then entitled to 
patent the invention or let the inventor file a patent in his or her own name (Harhoff and 
Hoisl, 2007). For the academic entrepreneur, this involves a risk not to obtain a license or 
only a non-exclusive license (Shane, 2002; Thursby and Thursby, 2002). Strong regimes can 
be plagued by ineffective incentives, information asymmetries, and contradictory motivations 
for academic entrepreneurs, organizations, and TTOs (Kenney and Patton, 2009). On the 
other hand, academic entrepreneurs benefit not only from the organization covering the costs 
of filing, renewing and defending a patent, but also from a better support infrastructure. This 
is because the prospect of additional revenue motivates organizations to invest into 
infrastructure to support technology commercialization (Baldini, 2009; Sellenthin, 2009). 
It is straightforward to argue that organizational characteristics should matter more in 
strong organizational regimes. In this context, the effect of patenting norms is reinforced as 
legal norms complement existing social norms and introduce a second sanctioning mechanism 
into the organization (Elster, 1989; Meek et al., 2010). Then, pressures to seek patents not 
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only emanate from the peer group, but also from legal authorities. Even in cases where such 
social norms are low or non-existing (Bercovitz and Feldman, 2008), strong regimes 
incentivize and entitle some actors within the organization, in particular the TTO, to patent 
employee inventions irrespective of inventor preferences (Kenney and Patton, 2009). A 
similar reasoning applies to organizational publication norms. Organizations high in such 
norms typically possess greater stocks of novel knowledge allowing academic entrepreneurs 
to produce more novel and patentable knowledge (Czarnitzki et al., 2009). However, given 
the additional obligations through legal norms, more of this knowledge is eventually patented 
in strong organizational regimes. Strong organizational regimes may also amplify the effect of 
organizational patenting capabilities. This is because academic entrepreneurs are more likely 
to patent if the organization does not only have a high success rate of patent applications, but 
also offers a supportive infrastructure, as is often characteristic of strong regimes (Baldini, 
2009; Sellenthin, 2009). Thus, ceteris paribus,  
 
Hypothesis 3a. In strong organizational regimes, organizational characteristics (as suggested 
in H2a-c) have stronger relations with academic entrepreneurs’ patent propensity than 
founding team characteristics (as suggested in H1a-b).  
 
Our arguments for the role of weak organizational regimes flow logically from the above: 
Since the reinforcing effect of additional legal norms is missing in weak regimes, founding 
team characteristics should play a stronger role for patenting decisions in this context. 
However, we expect organizational characteristics, as theorized in Hypotheses 2a - c, to be 
influential also in weak regimes but this influence should be smaller compared to strong 
regimes. Thus, ceteris paribus, 
 
  17 
Hypothesis 3b. In weak organizational regimes, founding team characteristics (as suggested 
in H1a-b) have stronger relations with academic entrepreneurs’ patent propensity than 




Technology-based spin-offs from public universities and research organizations in 
Germany, such as Fraunhofer Society, Helmholtz Association, Leibniz Science Association, 
and Max-Planck Society, provide the setting of our study. These institutions are among the 
key players in the German public science sector (Krabel and Mueller, 2009:948 for details). 
Before 2002, German universities reflected ‘weak organizational regimes’ because the so-
called professorial privilege (‘Hochschullehrerprivileg’) gave academic employees the full 
ownership of inventions. However, in 2002, this right was abolished by a modification of the 
Employees’ Inventions Act (§42 ArbNErfG), empowering universities to commercialize their 
employees’ inventions in most cases. The reform was enacted in January 2002 and relevant 
for all inventions made after February 6, 2002 (§43ArbNErfG). TTOs and extra-university 
patent & valorization agencies (‘Patentverwertungsagenturen’) were established to assist 
universities in patenting and commercializing patent rights. This relative recent regime 
change allows us to examine weak organizational regimes by sampling university spin-offs in 
the pre-2002 era. In turn, public research organizations represent ‘strong organizational 
regimes’ since they have been governed by the Employees’ Inventions Act of 1957 and were 
therefore not part of the legal reform of 2002 (Harhoff and Hoisl, 2007).6 Sampling from 
                                                 
6  Two points are important to note. First, research organizations and universities have started to increasingly 
collaborate in the recent years. For instance, the new mission of Helmholtz Association explicitly includes 
initiating and expanding networks to universities (Helmholtz Association, 2015). This can lead to cross-
affiliations, for instance where an academic from a research organization also holds an honorary university 
professorship or where a PhD student employed by a research organization is registered at a university as 
research organizations are not entitled to award PhDs in the German legislation. Second, although we model 
public research organizations as proxies for strong organizational regimes, there is notable variance in the 
patenting activities across these organizations. However, given that these are rather recent developments, we 
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research organizations is beneficial for the purpose of our study because it is, compared to the 
alternative sampling from universities in the post-2002 era, more likely to show the long-term 
effects of this Bayh-Dole-like act. 
 
Sample and Procedure 
This study combines survey and patent data. Survey data came from face-to-face 
interviews with academic entrepreneurs that were conducted as part of a larger study on 
academic spin-offs. After assembling an initial list of 850 firms from TTOs, print media, and 
the internet, we called 524 randomly selected spin-offs to request interview appointments. In 
2005 and 2006, trained interviewers conducted face-to-face interviews with those 288 spin-
offs willing to participate. One founder per spin-off volunteered as interviewee on behalf of 
the founding team and also provided names and academic degrees of the co-founders.7 The 
interviewee had to be involved in the development of the spin-off’s core technology and part 
of the founding team from the outset. We validated information on the founding team by 
searching the German commercial register (‘Handelsregister’). To be considered for our 
sample, a spin-off had to meet the following criteria: (1) The business model was based on a 
technological invention developed by at least one founder, excluding, for instance, consulting 
firms. This restriction is important as our model seeks to explain decisions to patent, thereby 
assuming patentability of the core technology. (2) At least one founder was an academic 
employee, including doctoral students, post-docs and professors, in a public university or 
research organization at the time of founding. (3) The spin-off was headquartered in 
Germany. 
                                                                                                                                                        
propose that pre-2002 universities and public research organizations in Germany adequately reflect weak and 
strong organizational regimes, respectively. 
7  Key informant responses were found to be particular accurate for salient events, for small rather than large 
firms, and for respondents with high hierarchical positions and long tenure (Homburg et al., 2012). Our 
interviews with start-up founders may meet these requirements, so that we expect the reliability of the 
responses to be high.  
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Patent data came from the database ‘PATSTAT’ provided by the European Patent 
Office. We searched for patent applications within a six-year period around incorporation, 
which included the pre-founding phase (two full years prior to incorporation and the 
incorporation year), and the post-founding phase (the following three years). Data were also 
collected for 8 and 10-year periods. These time frames allowed us to examine 87%, 92%, and 
96% of all patent family applications, respectively, from ten years prior to incorporation up to 
six years after (Figure 1). Since there is no theory or empirical evidence suggesting one time 
period as optimal for our study, we estimated regression models for all three periods and 
based our inference on the average effect. We considered applications that were (1) based on 
a founder’s invention and filed by the university or research organization, (2) filed by a 
founder, or (3) filed by the spin-off. Founders in Categories 1 and 2 were members of the 
university or research organization at the time of founding. However, the database contained 
no information on which of the patents in these categories were actually licensed back or used 
by the spin-off. We therefore inspected the content of the patents and included only those 
patents matching the spin-off’s core technology. Database searches for popular names, such 
as ‘Müller’ or ‘Schmidt’, occasionally produced excessive or ambiguous results. We then 
checked the content of the patents, the residence of the inventors and applicants, whether the 
founders’ university or research organization was listed as applicant and whether other 
founding team members were named as inventor or applicant. We excluded pre-founding 
patents co-filed by industry partners. These patents typically result from contract research or 
jobs in the industry and are often commercially exploited by the industry partner (Thursby et 
al., 2009).  
----------------------------------------------------- 
Please insert Figure 1 about here 
----------------------------------------------------- 
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The samples for weak and strong organizational regimes were matched in terms of 
technological fields and venture capital. This yielded a matched sample of 79 spin-offs from 
public universities and research organizations, respectively. Spin-offs originating in both 
types of organizations were excluded. The subsamples did not significantly differ in terms of 
founder and spin-off characteristics described below. Technological fields comprised 
software/simulation (39%), biotechnology (29%), photonics (8%), microelectronics (6%), 
microsystems (5%) and others (13%). The average venture had been in business for six years 
(sd = 2.40), had three founders (sd = 1.59), and employed nine full-time equivalents (sd = 
14.69). Spin-offs were founded between 1992 and 2001 regarding universities and 1995 to 
2005 regarding research organization.8 Overall, the 158 spin-offs originated in 50 universities 
and 66 research organizations. We accounted for the partly nested structure of the data in our 
analysis by using robust standard errors clustered at organizational level. About one half of 
the spin-offs had not filed patents in the six-year period (universities: 54%; research 
organizations: 48%). The average number of patent family applications was 3.32 (sd = 7.59) 
for universities and 5.27 (sd = 13.69) for research organizations. One spin-off had filed an 
extraordinarily high number of 109 patents. According to content analysis, this case did not 
qualify as an outlier. Regression analyses without the case did not substantially alter the 




Patent propensity refers to the tendency of an individual or a group to seek patents for 
inventions. In line with the extant literature (e.g., Brouwer and Kleinknecht, 1999), we 
                                                 
8  Some university spin-offs were founded in 2001, thus close to time when the modified Employees’ Inventions 
Act became effective. According to research by Dornbusch and Neuhäusler (2015), the prospect of the change, 
in particular the prospect of having to share patent revenues with the university, might have discouraged 
academic patenting already starting in 1999. However, spin-offs in our sample founded after 1998 do not 
significantly differ in their patenting activity from spin-offs created before that (F = .16, p > .10).  
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measured it as the number of patent family applications. A patent family comprises all patent 
applications based on the same invention in different jurisdictions. Grouping patent 
applications into families avoids redundant counts by considering the same invention only 
once in our data (Lettl et al., 2009). This measure captures the extent to which academic 
entrepreneurs opt for patents. We constructed the variables for the founding team and spin-off 
for the abovementioned 6-, 8- and 10-year periods. 
 
Independent Variables 
We derived an own measure for expert knowledge because our research design required 
shorter and less complex scales than existing ones. The scale describes the extent to which the 
founders were experts in their fields and knowledge about the core technology was 
unavailable via external sources. It was measured—like all other items, unless stated 
otherwise—on a 7-point Likert-scale (1 = “I completely disagree” to 7 = “I completely 
agree”) with three reflective items (alpha = .71). The items emphasize the related aspects of 
expert status and knowledge scarcity—the building blocks of our definition of expert 
knowledge—differently: One item (“Members of the founding team were considerably 
involved in technological breakthroughs in my company’s technological field.”) highlights 
the prior, whereas two other, reverse coded items highlight the latter (“Knowledge about the 
operational principles of my company’s core technology was widely disseminated in the 
scientific community.”, “Competitors were able to very quickly learn about the core 
technology from public sources (books, journals, internet, etc.) to the point of being able to 
implement it.”). Confirming criterion validity, the three-item measure is significantly 
correlated with measures for the popularity of the core technology (r = -.22, p < .001), market 
potential (r = .20, p < .05), and radicalness of patent family applications (r = .26, p < .05).  
To operationalize dimensions of entrepreneurial orientation, we built upon the 
established Covin and Slevin (1989) scale. Because the original scale referred to established 
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firms, we adjusted some items to the context of spin-offs. For instance, the item “[my firm] 
typically initiates actions which competitors then respond to” was replaced by the item “our 
company undertakes great efforts to find new applications for our core technologies and to 
open new markets for our existing products/services.” As the dimensionality of the construct 
is an area of ongoing debate (Rauch et al., 2009), we factor-analyzed the items to confirm the 
original three-factor solution. After dropping items with a factor loading of less than .40, a 
common rule of thumb (e.g., Richard et al., 2004), the three dimensions innovativeness (2 
items), proactiveness (3 items), and risk-taking (2 items) emerged, with alpha levels of .75, 
.64, and .70, respectively. Although the Average Variance Extracted of proactiveness (AVE = 
.44) was lower than the desired .50, Composite Reliability exceeded the recommended 
threshold of .60. Moreover, a test recommended by Fornell and Larcker (1981) confirmed 
discriminant validity of our scales. The sum of the three dimensions forms the final measure 
for entrepreneurial orientation.  
Following Calderini et al. (2007), we operationalized organizational patenting norms as 
the total number of patents per researcher that the organization has filed within a five-year 
period prior to the founding phase. Patent data were extracted from the PATSTAT database. 
Information on the number of researchers came from the German Federal Statistical Office. 
Organizational patenting capabilities were measured as the share of granted patents from all 
university patent applications within the five-year period. In eight cases where the spin-off 
originated from two or three organizations, we averaged the three organizational variables. To 
measure organizational publication norms, we counted publications per researcher from the 
ISI Web of Science. Our search included journal articles published within five full years prior 
to the pre-founding phase. Although ISI data is known for potential biases, e.g., 
overweighting journals published in English or disciplines that prefer journals to other 
research outlets (Crespi and Geuna, 2008), it belongs to the most widely used sources (e.g., 
Azoulay et al., 2007; Calderini et al., 2007).  
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Control Variables 
To isolate the effect of our predictor variables, we considered several control variables. 
An organizational focus on applied research can lead scientists to strive for more 
commercially-oriented discoveries and align their research agenda to the needs of the industry 
(Landry et al., 2007), possibly yielding more patentable outcomes. This variable was captured 
as the value of industry funding per academic employee (in 100,000 Euros), a measure similar 
to Di Gregorio and Shane (2003). We gathered data from the Federal Statistical Office (Series 
11-4.3.2, e.g., Statistisches Bundesamt, 2010). To measure patent effectiveness, an important 
driver of patenting, patent attorneys rated the degree to which patents reliably protect against 
imitation and grant enforceable rights in several technological fields (7-point Likert-scale; 1 = 
“very low effectiveness”, 7 = “very high effectiveness”). These fields were also used to 
categorize spin-offs and included biotechnology, microsystems, microelectronics, molecular 
electronics, nanotechnology, new materials, photonics, production techniques, and 
software/simulation. We sent a standardized questionnaire to 2,417 individuals, listed in the 
directory of German patent attorneys. Of those, 190 usable questionnaires were returned (8%). 
On average, the respondents had worked for 9.59 years (sd = 8.82) as patent attorneys and for 
14.87 years (sd = 10.33) in patent-related fields. An intraclass correlation of .99 indicated 
high inter-rater agreement. As each spin-off in our sample was active in only one 
technological field, we assigned the rating as our measure for patent effectiveness. Values 
ranged from an average rating of 3.63 (sd = 1.57) for production techniques to 5.84 (sd = 
1.10) for new materials.  
Technological uncertainty was captured with three reflective items conceptually based 
on the work of Bhide (1994) and Shane (2004b: 186-190). A significant correlation with a 
theoretically related measure of market uncertainty (r = .32, p < .001) confirms criterion 
validity. The measure is reliable at an alpha of .77. Patents are conducive to venture capital 
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investments, as they secure value of the firm and signal technological quality (Wright et al., 
2006). The same rationale might drive venture capitalists on the board of new ventures to 
encourage patenting. We measure it with a dummy (1 = “at least one venture capitalist holds 
stakes in firm equity”, 0 = else). Firms high in R&D intensity are more likely to develop 
patentable breakthrough innovation (Arundel and Kabla, 1998). We measure R&D intensity 
as the ratio of R&D employees and scientific founders to total employees and all founders. 
Larger spin-offs possess more resources to develop patentable inventions. We therefore 
controlled for the number of R&D employees including scientific founders. Prior research has 
linked patenting activity to publication performance (Baldini, 2009; Calderini et al., 2007; 
D’Este and Perkmann, 2011; Landry et al., 2007), leading us to include the number of 
publications by the founding team until the founding year as another control variable. 
Moreover, the theory of planned behavior suggests past behavior as a strong predictor of 
future behavior (Ajzen, 1991). Previous patenting does not only reflect a preference for and 
experience in patenting (Baldini, 2009; Sellenthin, 2009), it also be a rough proxy for prior 
patenting costs and efforts. We thus controlled for the number of previous patents filed by 
founding team members prior to the founding phase.  
 
RESULTS 
Tables 1 and 2 provide the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix for universities 
and research organizations, respectively. Table 3 displays the regression results. Since our 
dependent variables are counts of scores, we used negative binomial regression to estimate 
our models.9 Calculations of the variance inflation factor (VIF) revealed no serious 
multicollinearity problems (VIF < 3.70).  
                                                 
9  Poisson regression and its generalized form, the negative binomial regression, are two ways of dealing with 
count data (Hausman et al., 1984). The first model assumes that the conditional mean of the outcome is equal 
to the conditional variance. According to a likelihood-ratio test for overdispersion, the conditional variance of 
our dependent variable was significantly greater than the conditional mean, violating this assumption. We 
therefore used negative binomial regression which assumes a gamma distribution for the conditional mean, 
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----------------------------------------------------- 
Please insert Tables 1, 2 and 3 about here 
----------------------------------------------------- 
Our first set of hypotheses examined founding team characteristics. Hypothesis 1a 
suggested a positive influence of expert knowledge on patent propensity. The effect was 
positive and significant only in weak organizational regimes as represented by universities 
(Model 4, b = .39, p < .05). Hypothesis 1a thus received partial support. Similarly, 
entrepreneurial orientation was positively linked to patent propensity (Model 4, b = .20, p < 
.05) only in weak organizational regimes so that also Hypothesis 1b received partial support. 
A second set of hypotheses illuminated organizational characteristics. In line with Hypothesis 
2a, organizational patenting norms were positively related to patent propensity (Model 8, b = 
3.46, p < .05), but only in strong organizational regimes as represented by research 
organizations. Hypotheses 2b and 2c linked patent propensity to organizational patenting 
capabilities and organizational publication norms, respectively. Both hypotheses received no 
support (Models 4 and 8). According to a final set of hypotheses, the strengths of the above 
effects vary with the organizational regime. Hypothesis 3a predicted a stronger influence of 
organizational characteristics in strong organizational regimes. We used the seemingly 
unrelated estimation (SUEST) algorithm in Stata 11 to examine whether coefficients 
significantly differed across models. The results provide weak support for Hypothesis 3a: in 
strong organizational regimes, organizational characteristics had stronger positive 
relationships with patent propensity (Χ2 = 4.93, p < .10). Supporting Hypothesis 3b, founding 
team characteristics had stronger relationships with patent propensity in weak organizational 
regimes (Χ2 = 9.04, p < .05). 
                                                                                                                                                        
thereby allowing conditional mean and variance to vary. Moreover, given the excess of zeros in our dependent 
variables, a zero-inflated negative binomial regression might be more adequate. A Vuong (1989) test, however, 
revealed that correcting for zero inflation does not provide a better fit. 
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There are a number of notable findings for our control variables. Organizational focus 
on applied research was negatively and (weakly) significantly related to patent propensity. 
Possibly, such a focus coincides with more contract research within the organization so that 
also academic entrepreneurs ‘sell’ more of their intellectual property to the industry rather 
than claiming it for their ventures. Moreover, R&D intensity had significant effects only in 
weak organizational regimes. As one explanation, in weak regimes, academic entrepreneurs 
might transfer technological intermediates at an early stage, in order to finalize R&D within 
their ventures. In contrast, the number of previous patents was significantly related to patent 
propensity only in strong regimes, suggesting that an organizational emphasis on patenting 
might have also influenced patenting behavior of academic entrepreneurs in the past. 
Interestingly, patent effectiveness had no significant effect in strong regimes, for which two 
alternative explanations could be proposed. First, strong organizational regimes (mis-)lead 
academic entrepreneurs, for instance via organizational norms, routines, and the influence of 
the TTO, to also seek patents in fields offering only weak protection. Thus, in this context 
rigid organizational practices tend to emerge that can disregard founders’ interests. Second 
and supported by additional analyses, the variable ‘venture capital’ fully mediates the 
relationship between patent effectiveness and number of patent family applications in strong 
regimes.10 Therefore patent effectiveness is no longer statistically significant when controlling 
for the mediator ‘venture capital’.  
 
                                                 
10 Our analyses suggest that the conditions for a full mediation were met (Baron and Kenny, 1986): (1) The 
independent variable ‘patent effectiveness’ was significantly related to the mediator ‘venture capital’ (b = .76, 
p < .05; average effects reported); (2) when tested without the latter, patent effectiveness was significantly 
related to the dependent variable ‘patent propensity’ (b = 1.60, p < .01); (3) when tested together, venture 
capital (b = 1.40, p < .01) but not patent effectiveness (b = 1.37, ns) was significantly related to patent 
propensity. There are also theoretical arguments for these relationships: Fields with strong patent protection are 
more attractive for venture capitalists as they promise greater returns (Reitzig, 2003). Venture capitalists may 
encourage more intensive patenting to create patent fences,  to convert tacit founder knowledge into knowledge 
assets of the spin-off (Kim and Marschke, 2005) or to expand to international markets. Finally, venture 
capitalists may drive patenting only in strong regimes as this context is conducive to long-term and trust-based 
relationships with TTOs, which reduces transaction costs and facilitates patenting irrespective of founder 
preferences. 
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DISCUSSION 
In this study, we explored why academic entrepreneurs seek patents in weak vis-à-vis 
strong organizational regimes. Their decision is far from being straightforward: Some 
scholars proposed that spin-offs are dependent on patentability considerations (Lowe, 1993; 
Shane, 2001) and highlighted many advantages of patenting for spin-offs (e.g., Harter, 1994; 
Kaiser, 2009). Other scholars pointed to the many disadvantages and risks involved, in 
particular for spin-offs (Arundel, 2001; Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004). Specifically, we 
argued that founding team characteristics—expert knowledge (Hypothesis 1a) and 
entrepreneurial orientation (Hypothesis 1b)—as well as organizational characteristics—
patenting norms (Hypothesis 2a), patenting capabilities (Hypothesis 2b), and publication 
norms (Hypothesis 2c)—increase the patent propensity of academic entrepreneurs. Moreover, 
organizational characteristics prevail, as we further propose, in strong organizational regimes 
(Hypothesis 3a), whereas founding team characteristics prevail in weak organizational 
regimes (Hypothesis 3b). 
A first key insight of this study is that in strong organizational regimes, social norms 
seem to be a main driving force behind patenting by academic entrepreneurs. In this context, 
organizational patenting norms were the only of our hypothesized variables that was 
significantly related to patent propensity (Hypothesis 2a). Prior research has long documented 
the role of norms for scientists’ engagement in patenting (e.g., Bercovitz and Feldman, 2008). 
Our study does not only examine the neglected subgroup of academic entrepreneurs, it also 
suggests that besides norms several theoretically important aspects do not matter in strong 
organizational regimes. For instance, the ‘organizational success rate’ in patenting, in terms of 
organizational patenting capabilities (Hypothesis 2b), played no significant role in this 
context, although it is, on average, higher than in weak regimes (F > 80.14, p < .001). 
Moreover, the strong influence of organizational patenting norms could lead to an over-
reliance on patents vis-à-vis alternative protection mechanisms often preferred by smaller 
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firms (Arundel, 2001; Leiponen and Byma, 2009; Markman et al., 2005). This resembles 
Sampat’s (2006: 783) observation: “The importance of patents and licensing for development 
and commercialization of university inventions was not well understood during the Bayh-
Dole hearings and is not well understood today. Universities can patent any inventions 
developed by their faculty members and certainly do not limit their patenting to cases where 
commercialization would go forward even with no patenting and licensing.” Taken together, 
strong organizational regimes seem to be conducive to organizations creating rigid patenting 
procedures, which tend to ignore other critical interests in patenting. 
 A second key insight is that in weak organizational regimes, academic entrepreneurs 
higher in expert knowledge (Hypothesis 1a) and entrepreneurial orientation (Hypothesis 1b) 
seek patents more extensively. Prior research has often used proxies, such as holding a 
doctorate (Dietz and Bozeman, 2005), to measure endowments with human capital. This study 
captured levels of expert knowledge more directly and demonstrated that it is related to patent 
propensity above and beyond publishing and patenting experience. Moreover, although theory 
suggests attitudes as critical antecedent of human behavior (Ajzen, 1991), prior research has 
neglected attitudinal variables to explain why scientists vary in their tendency to disclose and 
patent. This article links a distinct attitudinal variable, namely entrepreneurial orientation, to 
patent propensity, both theoretically and empirically. The findings highlight the importance of 
considering attitudes in patenting research, at least in the context of weak organizational 
regimes. 
The finding that expert knowledge and entrepreneurial orientation had no significant 
effect in strong organizational regimes exceeded our expectations, as formulated in 
Hypothesis 3a. Prior research has already suggested that strong organizational regimes create 
incentives for universities, in particular TTO managers, to maximize short-term income from 
technology licensing (Kenney and Patton, 2009) and that licensing-for-cash is the most 
prevalent technology transfer mechanism (Markman et al., 2005). According to our findings, 
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founder preferences are ignored in this context. This seems to contradict observations that 
inventor cooperation is crucial to successfully commercialize a technology and that the 
inventor may therefore influence patenting decisions (e.g., Agrawal, 2006). To reconcile, even 
patent-averse founding teams might have initially engaged in symbolic patenting to satisfy the 
TTO and remain in good standing with the organization (Bercovitz and Feldman, 2008). The 
initial patents might have attracted venture capitalists or R&D alliance partners (Hertzfeld et 
al., 2006), which resulted in more patenting. Possibly, the founders also realized later that an 
effective protection required more than a single patent and started to build patent fences.  
In addition, this study informs the literature on patenting by being the first one (we 
know of) to track when and how extensively academic entrepreneurs seek patents. In this line 
of research, defining an appropriate time frame to track pre-founding patents for the spin-off 
is often a challenging task. In other words, how early do academic entrepreneurs start to 
patent in preparation of their spin-offs? Our data provides a first orientation by suggesting that 
87% to 96% of patenting activity takes place within a three to five-year window around 
incorporation. Moreover, about one half (52% for universities and 43% for research 
organizations) of the technology-based spin-offs has not filed patents in the ten-year window. 
This is surprising for scholars who consider patents as the pathway to establish competitive 
advantage for spin-offs (e.g., Lowe, 1993; Shane, 2001). It seems to confirm scholars who 
argued for the efficacy of alternative appropriation mechanisms, in particular in a start-up 
context (e.g., Arundel, 2001; Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004).  
Finally, our overall findings, in particular for the effect of patent effectiveness, warrant 
further discussion about the role of TTOs in strong organizational regimes. In one 
interpretation of the findings, patenting also takes place in areas where patents offer weak 
protection and rigid organizational procedures overrule interests of founders. This is 
consistent with views of the TTO as “risk-averse bureaucracies focused on short-term revenue 
maximization” (Kenney and Patton, 2009: 1412), having “an overemphasis on royalty income 
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and an underemphasis on entrepreneurship” (Markman et al., 2005: 241). Similarly, in 
organizations with independently funded TTOs that face greater pressures to generate 
revenues, scientists were found to avoid disclosing their inventions (Zibin et al., 2011). 
According to other studies, European TTOs lack critical business skills compared to their US 
counterparts (Chapple et al., 2005; Conti and Gaule, 2011). However, in another 
interpretation, the effect of patent effectiveness on patenting flows via venture capitalists. 
This implies a positive role of TTOs as boundary spanners to the wider business environment. 
Kenney and Patton (2009) make a similar point, when suggesting that TTOs could have 
advantages in negotiating with outside firms in terms of institutional power and experience. 
While the question of whether TTOs support or hinder spin-offs through their IP policies 
cannot be answered on base of our data, our findings document a tendency towards 
comprehensive patenting to an extent that founder interests may be ignored. 
 
Limitations and future research 
Our study is not without limitations. First, sampling solely from organizations in 
Germany may yield results that are mostly generalizable to this context. Country differences, 
such as variations in jurisdiction, culture, and industry structure, might generate different 
conditions for patenting. While we have no a priori reason to believe that the findings would 
fail to apply to other country settings, this study addressed only one setting. Second, we used 
research organizations to proxy strong organizational regimes because they are likely to 
reflect the long-term consequences of Bayh-Dole-like acts, at least in the German context. 
More research into the short-run consequences is needed, in particular on how such legal 
reforms transformed universities and how this affected the rationales and scope of patenting 
by academic entrepreneurs. Third, we have focused on theoretically important organizational 
and founding team characteristics, warranting more research on other determinants of 
patenting in the context of our study. Fourth, our focus on patents led us to neglect alternative 
  31 
appropriation mechanisms, such as lead-time advantage, secrecy, and complexity (Arundel, 
2001). Future research could therefore explore how often, in what combinations and with 
what success academic entrepreneurs employ these mechanisms. Finally, according to our 
findings, the shift from weak to strong organizational regimes has led academic entrepreneurs 
to seek patent for extrinsic rather than intrinsic motivations. Patenting might be more 
symbolic than substantial in strong regimes. For future studies, this raises the interesting 
question of how the quality of patents filed in both regimes differs and secures competitive 
advantage in both scenarios and what role the TTO plays in this milieu. 
 
Theoretical contributions 
This study has important implications for the current literature. One stream in the 
literature has focused on how legislative reforms affected technology transfer and innovation 
within a country (e.g., Sampat, 2006). A central finding is that university patenting has not 
changed in general, but in specific fields and universities (e.g., Henderson et al., 1998; Shane, 
2004a). Only recently, scholars started to discuss implications for academic entrepreneurship. 
Employer-ownership models were criticized for creating conditions—ineffective incentives, 
information asymmetry, and contradictory motivations for key stakeholders—that are not 
conducive to academic entrepreneurship (Kenney and Patton, 2009). Our study contributes to 
this line of work by providing theoretical and empirical insights into patenting rationales 
under different ownership regimes. In particular, our results indicate how much organizations 
governed under an employer-ownership model differ from other organizations in the patenting 
rationales of academic entrepreneurs. In strong organizational regimes, organizational norms 
became a key driving force, whereas more intrinsic motivation, as arising from expert 
knowledge and entrepreneurial orientation, were not relevant any more. It is not surprising 
(and has been proposed in Hypothesis 3a) that organizations having property rights in 
employee inventions exert more influence on patenting decisions. However, our findings 
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suggest that, in the context of our study, a residual, informal influence of the inventor may be 
low and patenting can become an organizational routine.  
The literature also reported that revenue opportunities created by employer-ownership 
models led organizations to create infrastructures to support patenting (Baldini, 2009; 
Sellenthin, 2009). However, to date, we lack knowledge about whether academic 
entrepreneurs are ‘pushed’ into patenting by an organizational norm or ‘pulled’ by the 
prospect of superior patenting capabilities and support on part of the organization. This study 
disentangled both influences by separately examining organizational patenting norms and 
organizational patenting capabilities. The latter reflects those aspects of the support 
infrastructure allowing the organization to successfully file a higher share of patents. Our 
findings add to the literature by showing that the culture-explanation rather than the 
capabilities-explanation seems to hold. In addition, our study allows to speculate about how 
the implementation of legal reforms affected social norms in terms of organizational patenting 
norms. In this study, patenting norms and previous patenting by the founders were effective in 
strong, but not weak organizational regimes. This might indicate that legal reforms stimulated 
the evolution of social norms as drivers of patenting and that academic entrepreneurs comply 
with these norms in the long run. 
Our findings for founding team characteristics add to the wider literature on patenting 
and invention disclosure. Combining hard data on patenting with perceptual data of founders 
allowed us to consider patenting rationales that were relatively neglected in the past. Prior 
work has measured endowments with human capital using proxies, such as holding a 
doctorate (Dietz and Bozeman, 2005), years after completing PhD (Landry et al., 2007), 
number and impact of previous publications (Baldini, 2009; Carayol, 2007), and having the 
rank of full professor (Bercovitz and Feldman, 2008). Our study captured human capital, in 
terms of levels of expert knowledge, more directly and demonstrated that it is related to patent 
propensity above and beyond publishing and patenting experience. It thereby disentangled 
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stocks of knowledge from its manifestation in patents and/or publications.11 Moreover, our 
findings for entrepreneurial orientation suggest that considering attitudinal variables is 
important for understanding patenting rationales, at least in a weak organizational regime. The 
concept may also provide interesting insights into other forms of behavior because it allows 
capturing variance in the self-concept of academic entrepreneurs between the polar forms of 
academic and entrepreneur. 
The study shed more light on the link between patenting and publishing. The 
publishing-patenting relationship is well explored for the individual scientist (e.g., Calderini 
et al., 2007), but rarely at the organizational level (Baldini, 2009; Carayol and Matt, 2004). 
This study is one of the first to examine the effect of university publication norms and 
academic entrepreneurs’ patenting, while controlling for previous publishing on part of the 
founding team. The findings indicate that both publication variables not significantly related 
to the tendency of academic entrepreneurs to seek patents.  
 
Practical implications 
The results have at least two straightforward implications for technology transfer 
policies. First, our findings suggest that organizational norms lead academic entrepreneurs to 
patent, without respect to the organizational capability to successfully navigate through the 
application process. This reminds policy makers at universities and research organizations of 
a particular risk for academic entrepreneurs that may even increase with efforts to reinforce an 
organization’s intellectual property rights: Filing patents that are eventually not granted or 
have low quality, thereby wasting valuable resources and disclosing critical knowledge. 
University administrations that lack resources and competences to effectively patent might 
                                                 
11 While expert knowledge of inventors is likely to motivate patenting by academic entrepreneurs and established 
firms alike, the underlying mechanisms may differ. Expert knowledge gives academic entrepreneurs the 
chance, as we argue, to mix patent strategies with other IP protection strategies, such as lead time. For 
established firms, it can involve a risk of inventor mobility and patenting becomes a defense against knowledge 
losses by employees joining a competitor or starting their own business (Kim and Marschke, 2005). 
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therefore profit more from considering alternative ways of claiming their ownership in 
inventions, for instance, by taking equity in the spin-off. The literature has highlighted the 
specific advantages of inventor-ownership models, for instance resolving conflicts of interest 
(Kenney and Patton, 2009), and provided examples of their success implementation (Kenney 
and Patton, 2011). Some of the most successful universities in technology transfer still sustain 
an intellectual property (IP) policy where full ownership of IP rests with the creator, allowing 
faculty to freely commercialize their ideas (Bramwell and Wolfe, 2008). 
Second, our findings might sensitize university administrations for academic 
entrepreneurs’ rationales in patenting. Such knowledge can help align technology transfer 
policies to spin-offs’ specific needs, in order to create a win-win situation between founders 
and organization. For instance, our findings suggest that, when expert knowledge and 
entrepreneurial orientation are high, academic entrepreneurs appreciate patents more and are 
thus more likely to fully support the patenting process. These insights also encourage policy 
makers and university administrations to critically reflect whether organizational and spin-off 
interests in patenting diverge. If organizational policies and culture lead academic 
entrepreneurs to adopt a patenting strategy (be it symbolic or substantial), alternative and 
possibly more effective protection strategies, such as secrecy, are neglected. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics and correlations for weak organizational regimes (public universities).a 
  Variable Min Max Mean SD 1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10   11   12   
1. Number of patent family applications .00 55.00 3.32 7.59 -                        2. Expert knowledge 1.00 7.00 5.19 1.20 .13  -                      3. Entrepreneurial orientation 4.00 20.00 14.27 3.06 .11  .24 * -                    4. Organizational patenting norms .00 .16 .00 .02 .21 t -.05  -.10  -                  5. Organizational patenting capabilities .00 1.00 .32 .37 .02  -.06  .11  .22 t -                6. Organizational publication norms .00 2.54 1.00 .54 .13  .12  -.07  .09  -.14  -              7. Focus on applied research 6.25 73.34 4.39 14.86 -.05  -.12  .23 * .33 ** .43 *** -.14  -            8. Patent effectiveness 3.63 5.84 4.65 1.18 .25 * .21 t .07  .06  -.04  .05  .04  -          9. Technological uncertainty 1.00 7.00 3.76 1.35 .08  -.04  .01  -.04  -.06  -.04  -.06  .27 * -        10. Venture capitalb .00 1.00 .19 .39 .01  .01  .03  -.09  -.04  .08  .01  .17  .22 * -      11. R&D intensity .16 1.00 .74 .22 .09  -.07  -.11  -.16  .04  .03  .17  .14  .20 t -.05  -    12. Number of publications .00 363.00 21.01 54.56 .30 ** .08  -.08  .70 *** .06  .15  .08  .10  -.03  .11  .13  -  13. Number of previous patents .00 11.00 .59 2.04 .27 * .06  .07  .57 *** .20 t .05  .24 * .15  .01  -.08  .03   .55 *** 
a n = 79. Pearson product moment correlations are reported for pairs of continuous variables, Spearman rank correlations for pairs of continuous and dichotomous 
variables. b Coding: 1 = at least one venture capitalist holds stakes in firm equity, 0 = else. 
t p < .10 
* p < .05 
** p < .01 
*** p < .001 (two-tailed test). 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics and correlations for strong organizational regimes (public research organizations).a 
  Variable Min Max Mean SD 1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10   11   12   
1. Number of patent family applications .00 109.00 5.27 13.69 -                        2. Expert knowledge 1.00 7.00 5.18 1.37 .06  -                      3. Entrepreneurial orientation 7.17 21.00 13.79 3.20 .22 t .16  -                    4. Organizational patenting norms .00 .68 .17 .13 -.05  .04  .01  -                  5. Organizational patenting capabilities .00 .91 .49 .21 .07  .12  -.02  .46 *** -                6. Organizational publication norms .00 48.97 1.31 5.51 -.02  .01  .05  .06  -.22 * -              7. Focus on applied research 9.44 182.06 65.09 53.66 -.12  .05  -.04  .54 *** .37 *** -.09  -            8. Patent effectiveness 3.63 5.84 4.65 1.18 .23 * -.15  -.07  .04  .04  .10  -.13  -          9. Technological uncertainty 1.00 6.33 3.67 1.53 .00  .11  .16  .09  .15  -.02  -.04  -.19  -        10. Venture capitalb .00 1.00 .18 .38 .16  -.13  .29 * -.14  .01  .15  -.11  .27 * .02  -      11. R&D intensity .08 1.00 .79 .20 -.05  .24 * -.11  -.11  .07  -.10  .01  .00  .06  -.06  -    12. Number of publications .00 853.00 32.67 103.61 .06  .00  .03  -.06  .03  .04  -.17  .24 * -.09  .20  .00  -  13. Number of previous patents .00 7.00 .67 1.30 .22 * .15  -.04  .05  .24 * -.08  .02  .29 * -.06  -.11  -.09   .22 t 
a n = 79. Pearson product moment correlations are reported for pairs of continuous variables, Spearman rank correlations for pairs of continuous and dichotomous 
variables. b  Coding: 1 = at least one venture capitalist holds stakes in firm equity, 0 = else. 
t p < .10 
* p < .05 
** p < .01 
*** p < .001 (two-tailed test). 
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Table 3 
Results for regression analyses of patent propensity.a 
  
Weak organizational regimes (Universities) 
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Expert knowledge .40 * .20 
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Organizational focus on applied research -.05 ** .02 
 
-.04 * .02 
 
-.04 ** .01 
 
-.04 ** .02 
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Patent effectiveness .66 *** .17 
 
.79 *** .19 
 
.79 *** .19 
 


































































2.12 ** .71 
 
2.15 ** .73 
 
1.74 ** .66 
 
2.00 ** .70 
 
R&D intensity 3.66 *** 1.05 
 
3.71 *** 1.00 
 
4.06 *** .97 
 
































































.56 *** .14 
 
.60 *** .16 
 
.57 ** .21 
 
.58 ** .17 
                                 
 
Log likelihood -139.74 
   
-152.12 
   
-158.18 
   
-150.01 
   
-168.83 
   
-181.09 
   
-192.29 
   
-180.74 
    Wald chi-square 185.94 ***    265.47 ***    162.67 ***    204.69 ***    45.95 ***    55.68 ***    76.23 ***    59.29 ***  
a n = 79 for universities and research organizations, respectively. Robust standard errors clustered at organizational level. b Average effect over all examined time 
periods. c Coding: 1 = at least one venture capitalist holds stakes in firm equity, 0 = else. 
t p < .10 
* p < .05 
** p < .01 
*** p < .001 (two-tailed). 
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Expert knowledge (α = .71, CR = .77, AVE = .53)   
Members of the founding team were considerably involved in technological breakthroughs 
in my company’s technological field. 
.75 12.16 
Knowledge about the operational principles of my company’s core technology was widely 
disseminated in the scientific community. (r) 
.68 11.05 
Competitors were able to very quickly learn about the core technology from public sources 
(books, journals, internet, etc.) to the point of being able to implement it. (r) 
 
.74 12.00 
Entrepreneurial Orientation: Innovativeness (α = .75, CR = .76, AVE = .62)   
Our company has introduced many new products or services over the past three years. .70 8.89 
Changes in products or service lines have usually been quite dramatic. .87 10.08 
   
Entrepreneurial Orientation: Proactiveness (α = .64, CR = .70, AVE = .44)   
Our company undertakes great efforts to find new applications for our core technologies and 
to open new markets for our existing products/services.  
.65 9.89 
Our company introduces new technologies and methods for the production of our 
products/services long before our competitors do so. 
.62 9.46 
My company typically waits until other companies introduce new products/services to the 
market before introducing new products/services. (r) 
.72 10.95 
   
Entrepreneurial Orientation: Risk-taking (α = .70, CR = .71, AVE = .55)   
Over the past three years, our company has engaged in very many high-risk projects with 
chances of very high returns. 
.73 7.76 
Our company has emphasized taking bold, wide-ranging and capital-intensive actions in 
positions itself and its products/services over the past three years. 
.75 7.84 
   
Technological uncertainty (α =.77 , CR = .80, AVE = .60)   
It was easy to understand, which other technologies our company required besides our core 
technology to create marketable products (r). 
.41 6.72 
The time to develop our core technology to marketability could be clearly estimated. (r) .94 16.23 
The costs to develop our core technology to marketability could be clearly estimated. (r) .84 14.87 
   
r = reverse coded, α = Cronbach’s Alpha; CR = Composite Reliability; AVE = Average Variance 
Explained; Model fit: χ2/df = 1.59; GFI = .92; AGFI = .89, RMSEA = .05.  
 
